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Abstract
The median voter model (direct democracy) has wide applicability, but it is
based on sel￿sh voters i.e. voters who derive utility solely from ￿ own￿payo⁄. The
recent literature has pointed to fairness and concern for others as basic human mo-
tives that explain a range of economic phenomena. We examine the implications of
introducing fair voters who have a preference for fairness as in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). Within a simple general equilibrium model, we demonstrate the existence
of a Condorcet winner for fair voters using the single crossing property of voters￿
preferences. In a fair voter model, unlike a sel￿sh voter model, poverty can lead
to increased redistribution. Mean preserving spreads of income increase equilibrium
redistribution. Greater fairness leads to greater redistribution. The introduction of
sel￿sh voters in an economy where the median voter is fair can have a large impact
on the redistributive outcome. An empirical exercise using OECD data illustrates
the potential importance of fairness in explaining redistribution.
Keywords: Redistribution, other regarding preferences, single crossing property,
income inequality, American Exceptionalism.
JEL Classi￿cation: D64 (Altruism); D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes:
Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior); D78 (Positive Analysis
of Policy-Making and Implementation).
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All societies face the issue of aggregating individual preferences into social outcomes. In
actual practice, such policies are chosen by the elected representatives of the citizens (i.e.
representative democracy). Furthermore, the political process is complicated by issues of
political agency, information asymmetries, and legislative logrolling etc.1.
However, in a range of applications in political economy, one often needs to abstract
away from some of these issues. Indeed, there is a rich literature in public economics that
relies on the simpler notion of a median voter who directly chooses the social outcome; for
instance, Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Recent experience in Western democracies suggests that direct democracy is more than
a useful benchmark. Figures given in Matsusaka (2005a) (who terms the increasing trend
in direct democracy as the "storm in ballot box lawmaking") are instructive. In the US, 70
percent of the population lives in a state or city where the apparatus of direct democracy is
available. There have been at least 360 citizen initiated measures in the last 10 years in the
US and at least 29 referenda on monetary and market integration in Europe have already
been held. Matsusaka (2005b) argues that there is a fundamental shift in how policy
decisions are made. The implications of direct democracy for representative democracy are
profound2.
1.1. The RRMR model
The pioneering work on redistribution within a direct democracy framework was done
by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981).3 The, commonly used,
collective name for this class of models is the ￿ RRMR￿model. Since voters in the RRMR
model care only about their narrow self-interest, we call it the sel￿sh voter model.
In the basic model, the problem is to choose a linear progressive income tax rate that
accomplishes redistribution in the sense that the post tax distribution of income re￿ ects
1See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a comprehensive exposition of such issues.
2Direct citizen initiatives and referenda can override broken campaign promises and reduce the likeli-
hood that elected representatives choose policies that the majority will not desire. This mitigates agency
problems to an extent. When information is dispersed among the electorate, a referendum can elicit such
information better, hence, direct democracy improves the quality of information. If legislatures bundle
contentious issues together, the possibility of referenda can force them to be unbundled. The same applies
to the attempts of politicians to bundle multiple issues. Thus, direct democracy induces greater trans-
parency of issues. Limited information on the part of voters might not be a serious hindrance. Voters
might use information cues that permit a fairly informed decision. For instance, voters voting on the
environment might just mimic the stance taken by Greenpeace or by Ralph Nader. For these and other
issues see Matsusaka (2005a).
3The pioneering work on the existence of a Condorcet winner in a unidimensional policy space is Black
(1948).
1relatively greater equality. Romer (1975) laid out the conditions for single-peaked prefer-
ences when labor supply is endogenous. Roberts (1977) weakened the single-peakedness
condition to hierarchical adherence. Gans and Smart (1996) proposed the single crossing
property as an alternative method of determining a Condorcet winner and demonstrated
that hierarchical adherence and single crossing are equivalent in a redistributive context.
Meltzer and Richard (1981) derived the testable prediction that the extent of redis-
tribution directly depends on the ratio between mean and median income. The intuition
is that as inequality increases, the median voter is relatively poorer and, hence, chooses
greater redistribution.4 The evidence on the relation between inequality and redistribution
is mixed, however. Positive support is found by Meltzer and Richard (1981), Easterly and
Rebelo (1993), Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic
(2000). However, Lindert (1996), Perotti (1996) do not ￿nd any support.
The RRMR framework treats only a speci￿c kind of transfer, namely, the intra-
generational transfers of income. In actual practice, the growth of government transfers
in recent decades has been driven by a range of other considerations. For instance, the
increased (inter-generational) transfers to the old could possibly re￿ ect their growing po-
litical clout in Western democracies. Regional transfers could arise from special interest
group considerations. Unemployment and health insurance can only be understood within
the model insofar as these entail intra-generational transfers. These issues are possibly
better analyzed within a dynamic model5.
1.2. Why fairness?
Traditional economic theory relies on the twin assumptions of rationality and self-interested
behavior. The latter is generally taken to imply that individuals are interested mainly in
their own pecuniary payo⁄s (sel￿sh preferences). This view is not always in conformity
with the evidence. The purely sel￿sh individual model is unable to explain a range of phe-
nomena from many diverse areas such as collective action, contract theory, the structure
of incentives, political economy and the results of several experimental games. Individuals
are also often motivated by the pecuniary and non-pecuniary payo⁄s of others. A substan-
tial fraction of individuals exhibit social preferences, i.e., care about the consumption and
well being of others. Evidence from a range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum
game, the gift exchange game, the public good game with punishment etc. can easily be
4It is not commonly realized that this follows from the special case of quasi-linear preferences with
quadratic disutility from labour.
5Alesina and Rodrik (1994) discuss issues of growth and redistribution. Persson and Tabellini (1994)
deal with a model of reputation in which the device of inter-generational punishment can sustain redis-
tribution to the old. Tabellini (1991) shows how altruism among the young can sustain transfers to the
old. Galasso and Conde Ruiz (2005) consider two policy tools: intra-generational and inter-generational
transfers. Several models of unemployment insurance are surveyed in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2reconciled if we assume individuals to have social preferences.6
It may seem obvious to many that issues of fairness and regard for others (social
preferences) motivative the human desire to redistribute. The experimental results of
Ackert et al. (2007), Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2002) are
strongly supportive of the importance of social preferences in the domain of voting models.
Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) examine pure transfers of income from the rich to the
poor that do not a⁄ect the middle income voter. Some rich voters, on account of their
fairness, vote for the transfers to the poor in circumstances where a rich, but sel￿sh,
voter would have voted otherwise. Hence, a majority of the fair voters might vote for
redistribution while, under similar circumstances, a sel￿sh voter model might predict no
redistribution; this is the important contribution of that paper.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2002) examine the preference for equity versus e¢ ciency in a
voting game. Groups of three subjects are formed and are presented with two alternative
policies: one that promotes equity while the other promotes e¢ ciency. The ￿nal outcome
is chosen by a majority vote. About twice as many experimental subjects preferred equity
as compared to e¢ ciency. Furthermore, even those willing to change the status-quo for
e¢ ciency are willing to pay, on average, less than half relative to those who wish to alter
the status-quo for equity.
Our innovation is to replace the sel￿sh voters in the RRMR sel￿sh voter model by fair
voters: this we will call the fair voter model.
1.3. Which model of fairness?
There are several models of fairness. We choose to use the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) (hence-
forth, FS) approach to fairness7. In this approach, voters care not only about their own
payo⁄s but their payo⁄s relative to those of others. If their payo⁄ is greater than other
voters then they su⁄er from advantageous inequity (arising from, say, altruism) and if their
payo⁄ is lower than other voters they su⁄er from disadvantageous inequity (arising from,
say, envy).
Several reasons motivate our choice of the FS model. The FS model is tractable and
explains the experimental results arising from several games where the prediction of the
standard game theory model with sel￿sh agents yields results that are not consistent with
the experimental evidence. These games include the ultimatum game, the gift exchange
6The references are too numerous to list. A good place to start is the book by Camerer (2003) and the
survey article by Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). The neuroeconomic foundations of reciprocity are surveyed
in Fehr et al. (2005).
7Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide yet another approach of inequity averse economic agents, but it
cannot explain the outcome of the public good game with punishment, which is a fairly robust experimental
￿nding (see below).
3game, the dictator game as well as the public good game with punishment8.
The FS model focusses on the role of inequity aversion. However, a possible objection
is that it ignores the role played by intentions that have been shown to be important in
experimental results (Falk et al. (2002)) and treated explicitly in theoretical work (Rabin
(1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). However, experimental results on the importance
of intentions come largely from bilateral interactions. Economy-wide voting, on the other
hand, is impersonal and anonymous, thereby ruling out any important role for intentions.
Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) explicitly test for the importance of the FS framework
in the context of direct voting. They conclude that the FS model predicts much better
than the standard sel￿sh voter model. In addition, the FS model provides, in their words,
￿strikingly accurate predictions for individual voting in all three income classes.￿ The
econometric results of Ackert et al. (2007), based on their experimental data, lend further
support to the FS model in the context of redistributive taxation. The estimated coe¢ -
cients of altruism and envy in the FS model are statistically signi￿cant and, as expected,
negative in sign. Social preferences are found to in￿ uence participant￿ s vote over alter-
native taxes. They ￿nd evidence that some participants are willing to reduce their own
payo⁄s in order to support taxes that reduce advantageous or disadvantageous inequity.
1.4. A critique of the literature on voting and fairness
There is a relatively small theoretical literature that considers fair voters. We concentrate
below on the papers that are directly relevant to our work. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006),
reviewed above, do not analyze the relation between inequality and redistributive taxes
which is important in the RRMR framework (and ours￿ ). Their￿ s is not a general equi-
librium model, does not analyze the e¢ ciency costs of redistribution, does not look at a
mixture of fair and sel￿sh voters and, probably most importantly, does not provide exis-
tence results for there to be a decisive median voter. Furthermore, they consider a more
restricted tax policy choice than us. While we consider changes in a linear progressive
income tax that a⁄ect all taxpayers they focus attention only on redistributions from the
rich to the poor that leave the middle income voters una⁄ected9.
Galasso (2003) modi￿es the RRMR model to allow for fairness concerns. However,
his notion of fairness is not only one-sided but it is of a very speci￿c form; it is not fully
8In the ￿rst three of these games, experimental subjects o⁄er more to the other party relative to the
predictions of the Nash outcome. In the public good game with punishment, the possibility of ex-post
punishment dramatically reduces the extent of free riding in voluntary giving towards a public good. In
the standard theory with sel￿sh agents, bygones are bygones, so there is no ex-post incentive for the
contributors to punish the free-riders. Foreseeing this outcome, free riders are not deterred, which is in
disagreement with the evidence. Such behavior can be easily explained within the FS framework.
9They do introduce a cost of such redistribution to the middle income voters, but it is not an integral
part of the redistributive ￿scal package considered.
4consistent with any of the accepted models of fairness. In particular, fair voters care about
their own payo⁄s but su⁄er disutility through a term that is linear in their payo⁄s relative
to the worse o⁄voter in society.10 Since this concern for fairness arises from a linear term,
preferences continue to be strictly concave and a median voter equilibrium exits. Within
this framework there is greater redistribution when there is a mean preserving spread in
inequality. However, this leaves open the question of whether a median voter equilibrium
will exist in a standard model of fairness, such as the FS model, and what the properties
of the resulting equilibrium will be?
1.5. An example: European versus American redistribution
Europe, where (disposable income) inequality is lower, undertakes greater redistribution
than America, where such inequality is higher. This would seem to contradict the RRMR
model. Alesina and Angeletos (2003) have a novel explanation. The key to understanding
their model is the individual beliefs on the source of poverty (or a› uence). More Americans
than Europeans believe that poverty (or a› uence) is caused by individual e⁄ort than
luck. A crucial assumption of the model is that voters expect there to be greater public
redistribution if income outcomes are governed by luck rather than e⁄ort. Hence, in
the European equilibrium, more people believe that income is caused by luck, so put in
less e⁄ort and, hence, actual outcomes are indeed governed more by luck rather than
e⁄ort. Given the assumption on public redistribution, there is greater redistribution in
equilibrium. The American, high e⁄ort - low redistribution equilibrium can be understood
analogously.
Benabou (2000) develops a stochastic growth model with incomplete asset markets and
heterogeneous agents who vote over redistributive policies. He shows that multiple equi-
libria can exist, some featuring low inequality and high redistribution, while others exhibit
high inequality and low redistribution. Thus countries with similar preference, technologies
and political systems can feature very di⁄erent levels of inequality and redistribution.
Theory is very explicit about the inequality variable required: it should be pre-tax/transfer
distribution of income i.e. the factor income distribution. Theory does not necessarily pre-
dict any relation between disposable income and redistribution. However, most work on
the relation between inequality and redistribution uses disposable income data. Factor
income data has recently been made available in Milanovic (2000). Are inequality ￿g-
10The latter term captures some notion of social justice. Others have included such a term to incorporate
social justice e.g. Charness and Rabin (2002). However, they posit preferences, di⁄erent from Galasso
(2003), that are a convex combination of the total payo⁄ of the group (this subsumes sel￿shness, in so
far as one￿ s own payo⁄ is part of the total, and altruism) and a Rawlsian social welfare function. These
sorts of models are able to explain positive levels of giving in dictator games, and reciprocity in trust and
gift exchange games. However, they are not able to explain situations where an individual tries to punish
others in the group at some personal cost, for instance, punishment in public good games.
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Figure 1.1: An illustrative comparison beween Sweden and the US
ures based on factor incomes and disposable income signi￿cantly di⁄erent? The results
in Milanovic (2000) show that almost a third of factor income inequality is removed by
government tax and transfer programs. As an illustrative example, consider a relative
comparison of Sweden and the US in Figure 1.1. DII denotes disposable income inequal-
ity, SS/GDP denotes the ratio of social spending to gross domestic product, FII denotes
factor income inequality and Multi-Aid/GDP is multilateral aid to the GDP ratio.
Disposable income inequality in Sweden is about 60 percent that of the US. However
factor income inequality is almost identical. Sweden social spending to GDP ratio is about
twice that of the US. Since FII is the relevant income inequality variable that theory uses, it
would be hard to explain to the Swedish versus US comparison based on income inequality
alone.
We provide an alternative explanation for greater European redistribution relative to
America by using the argument that Europeans are relatively more inequity averse on
average and that there is basis for ￿ American Exceptionalism￿ 11. Our ￿rst explanation
requires us to construct some empirical measure of fairness. Measuring fairness presents a
challenging, and understandably contentious, set of issues. We now turn to these.
One could possibly use charitable giving per capita as an indicator of fairness. How-
ever, charitable contributions are endogenous in a model with fair voters. So, for instance,
if government redistribution is perceived to be inadequate, citizens might attempt to com-
pensate by donating more to charity. For that reason we do not believe that the relatively
greater per capita giving of Americans necessarily indicates that they are more inequity
averse than Europeans.
A better measure of fairness/ inequity aversion seems to be aid given to other countries,
particularly, developing countries. A criticism, similar to our objection against using
charitable contributions to proxy inequity aversion, also applies for aid because aid given
by a country to any particular developing country might re￿ ect the low volume of aggregate
11A good summary (and some historical background) of American Exceptionalism is provided in Glaeser
(2005); the reasons include proportional versus majoritarian representation, greater ethnic heterogeneity
in America, and the US tradition of federalism that gives redistributive powers to the individual States,
among others.
6giving to that country in the ￿rst place. However, crucially, this applies equally to all giving
countries. Hence, relative giving of countries potentially re￿ ects relative fairness/ inequity
aversion. This is the measure that we will use.
While the US is the single largest contributor to development aid, in per capita terms
its contribution is lower than most European countries. According to OECD ￿gures, the
US contributed only 0.15 percent of its GDP to development assistance, placing it last
in a list of 21 western (mostly European) countries. The Center for Global Development
estimated that US development assistance per capita is one eighth that of Norway, one
sixth that of Denmark and close to half of the average contributions of Belgium, France,
Finland and Britain.
Coming back to the Swedish versus US comparison in Figure 1.1, our proxy for inequity
aversion, multilateral aid to GDP ratio, for Sweden is about 9 times that of the US. We
argue that this reveals greater inequity aversion of the Swedes relative to the US and
potentially helps to explain the di⁄erences in the social spending to GDP ratios between
the two countries; a di⁄erence that factor income inequality is unable to explain.
1.6. Results and plan of the paper
Our main theoretical results are as follows. First, we demonstrate the existence of a Con-
dorcet winner for voters who have the FS preferences for fairness. Insofar as one believes
that issue of fairness and concern for others underpin the human tendency to redistribute,
this result opens the way for modelling such concerns in the context of direct democracy.
Second, if voters are fair, then increased poverty can lead to increased redistribution and
the ratio of social spending to GDP would move countercyclically, which is at variance
with the sel￿sh voter model, but in agreement with the evidence. Third, the introduction
of sel￿sh poor voters in an economy where the median voter is fair can have a large impact
on the redistributive outcome and may actually reduce redistribution. In other settings,
even in the presence of a majority of fair voters the redistributive outcome is identical to
that of an economy comprising solely of sel￿sh voters.
Due to the paucity of data on factor incomes, we claim to provide no more than an
illustrative empirical exercise that provides empirical support to the idea that fairness is
an important determinant of redistribution. Conditional on the limitations of our exercise,
our regression results, based on data from 20 OECD economies, can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, factor income inequality leads to a better speci￿cation than disposable income
inequality12. Second, the results support the idea of ￿ American Exceptionalism￿relative
to Europe. Third, our fairness variable is a signi￿cant determinant of redistribution, while
12Theory only predicts a relation between pre-tax or factor income distribution and redistribution (not
between post-tax income distribution and redistribution). However, the existing empirical work largely
uses disposable (or post-tax/transfer) income instead of factor income.
7income inequality is not signi￿cant.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and derives
some intermediate results. Section 3 derives the conditions needed for the existence of a
Condorcet winner for fair voters. Comparative static results along with some calibration
exercises are derived and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 considers the relationship
between income distribution and the tax rate using a discrete analogue of second order
stochastic dominance. Section 6 considers an economy where there is a mixture of fair
and sel￿sh voters. Section 7 presents our illustrative empirical exercise. Finally, section 8
concludes. The results of regression analysis are presented in Appendix 1. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix 2.
2. Model
We consider a general equilibrium model as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Let there be
n = 2m ￿ 1 ￿ 3 voters, where m is the median voter. Let the skill level of voter i be si,
where
0 < si < sj < 1, for i < j, (2.1)
and s = (s1;s2;:::;sn). Each voter has a ￿xed time endowment of one unit and supplies li
units of labor and so enjoys Li = 1 ￿ li units of leisure, where
0 ￿ li ￿ 1. (2.2)
Labour markets are competitive and each ￿rm has access to a linear production technol-
ogy such that production equals sili. Hence, the wage rate o⁄ered to each worker-voter
coincides with the marginal product, i.e., the skill level, si. Thus, the before-tax income
of a voter is given by
yi = sili. (2.3)
Note that ￿ skill￿here need not represent any intrinsic talent, just ability to translate labour
e⁄ort into income13. Let the average before-tax income be y = 1
n￿n
i=1yi. We make the








Since typical income distributions are skewed to the left, (2.4) is empirically plausible.
13For example, a highly talented classical musician may be able to earn only a modest income, while
a merely competent ￿ pop￿musician may earn millions. In our model, the former would be classi￿ed as
having a low s while the latter would be classi￿ed as having a high s. Similarly, in recent years, there
has been a record level of skilled (in the ordinary sense of the word) migration into Britain from Eastern
Europe. However, since they are predominantly accepting low pay work, they would be classi￿ed in our
model as having low s.
8The government operates a linear progressive income tax that is characterized by a
constant marginal tax rate, t 2 [0;1], and a uniform transfer, b, to each voter that equals
the average tax proceeds,





i=1yi ￿ 0. (2.5)






Remark 1 From (2.6), changes in the tax rate can equivalently be viewed as changes in
the ratio of social spending to aggregate income.
The budget constraint of voter i is given by
0 ￿ ci ￿ (1 ￿ t)yi + b. (2.7)
In view of (2.3), the budget constraint (2.7) can be written as
0 ￿ ci ￿ (1 ￿ t)sili + b. (2.8)
2.1. Preferences, labour supply and indirect utility of a sel￿sh voter
Voter i (whether sel￿sh or fair) has a utility function, u(ci;1￿li), over own consumption,
ci, and own leisure, 1 ￿ li. In common with the literature, we assume that all voters have
the same utility function. Hence, voters di⁄er only in that they are endowed with di⁄erent
skill levels, si. We assume that the utility function has the following, plausible, properties.
It is thrice continuously di⁄erentiable and
(a) u1 > 0, (b) l > 0 ) u2(c;1 ￿ l) > 0, (c) u2 (c;1) = 0, (d) u1 (c;0) ￿ u2 (c;0), (2.9)
(a) u11 ￿ 0, (b) u12 ￿ 0, (c) l > 0 ) u22(c;1 ￿ l) < 0, (2.10)
From (2.9a), the marginal utility of consumption is positive, while (2.9b) implies that mar-
ginal utility of leisure is positive, unless l = 0 in which case (2.9c) says that the consumer
is satiated with leisure. From (2.9d), when a consumer has no leisure she always (weakly)
prefers one extra unit of leisure to one extra unit of consumption. (2.10a) says that mar-
ginal utility of consumption is non-increasing. Consumption and leisure are complements
(see, (2.10b)) while (2.10c) implies that the marginal utility of leisure is strictly declining
unless, possibly, the consumer is satiated with leisure (in which case u22(c;1) = 0). The
conditions (2.9) and (2.10) will guarantee that a maximum exists, that it is unique and
that it is an interior point (0 < li < 1), unless t = 1 in which case the maximum will
lie at li = 0. Alternative conditions can also guarantee a unique interior maximum but
9(2.9) and (2.10) are chosen because they can be satis￿ed by a quasi-linear utility function,
which is the most commonly used functional form in various applications of the median
voter theorems.
Since @u
@ci > 0, the budget constraint (2.8) holds with equality. Substituting ci =
(1 ￿ t)sili + b in the utility function of voter i, we get
U (li;t;b;si) = u((1 ￿ t)sili + b;1 ￿ li). (2.11)
Given t and b, voter i chooses labour supply, li, in order to maximize the objective function
in (2.11). We list, in lemmas 1, 2, below, some useful results.
Lemma 1 (Properties of labour supply): (a) Given t;b and si, there is a unique labour
supply for voter i, li = l(t;b;si), that maximizes utility (2.11),
(b) t 2 [0;1) ) 0 < li < 1,
(c) li = 0 at t = 1,











(g) for each t 2 [0;1], the equation b = 1
nt￿n
i=1sil(t;b;si) has a unique solution b(t;s) ￿ 0;
and b(t;s) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
Substituting labour supply, given by Lemma 1 (a), in (2.11) we get the indirect utility
function of voter i:
vi = v (t;b;si) = U (l(t;b;si);t;b;si). (2.12)














= 0, (cii) t 2 [0;1) )
@v(t;b;s)
@t < 0.
Substituting labour supply, l(t;b;si), into (2.3) gives before-tax income:
yi (t;b;si) = sil(t;b;si). (2.13)
Substitute b(t;s), given by Lemma 1(g), into the indirect utility (2.12), to get
wi (t;s) = v (t;b(t;s);si). (2.14)
102.2. Preferences of fair voters
Fair voters have other regarding preferences as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999). These preferences
are as follows











maxf0;v (t;b;sj) ￿ v (t;b;si)g,
where
for sel￿sh voters ￿ = ￿ = 0, (2.16)
for fair voters 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ < ￿. (2.17)
From (2.15), the fair voter cares about own payo⁄(￿rst term), payo⁄relative to those where
inequality is disadvantageous (second term) and payo⁄ relative to those where inequality
is advantageous (third term). The second and third terms which capture respectively, envy
and altruism, are normalized by the term n ￿ 1 where n is the number of voters. Notice
that in FS preferences, inequality is self-centered, i.e., the individual uses her own payo⁄as
a reference point with which everyone else is compared to. Also, while the Fehr-Schmidt
speci￿cation is directly in terms of monetary payo⁄s, it is also consistent with comparison
of payo⁄s in utility terms. These and related issues are more fully discussed in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). From (2.17), ￿ is bounded below by 0 and above by 1 and ￿. On the
other hand, there is no upper bound on ￿.14
In the light of Lemmas 2(bi) and 2(bii), (2.15) becomes








































14￿ ￿ 1 would imply that individuals could increase utility by simply giving away all their wealth; this
is counterfactual. The restriction ￿ < ￿ is based on experimental evidence. Finally the lack of an upper
limit on ￿ implies that ￿ envy￿is unbounded.
11where
i < j ) !ij =
￿
n ￿ 1















Wj (t;￿;￿;s) = Vj (t;b(t;s);￿;￿;s); (2.22)
where b(t;s) is given by Lemma 1(g). Then (2.14), (2.18) and (2.22) give










[wj (t;s) ￿ wi (t;s)].
(2.23)
Remark 3 : (Existence of a maximum) Since u(ci;1 ￿ li) and l(t;b;si) are continuous,
it follows from (2.11), (2.12), (2.14) and (2.23) that Wj (t;￿;￿;s) attains a maximum at
some tj 2 [0;1].
2.3. Sequence of moves
We consider a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, voters choose a tax rate, t, and a lumpsum
bene￿t, b, anticipating the outcome of the second stage. Consumer j exhibits fairness by




!ijv (t;b;si), as seen from her own perspective (see Remark 2). In
the second stage, consumer j chooses own labour supply, lj, so as to sel￿shly maximize
own utility, U (lj;t;b;sj), given t;b;sj. This determines labour supplies, li = l(t;b;si), and
indirect utilities, vi = v (t;b;si) = U (l(t;b;si);t;b;si), i = 1;2;:::;n.
Remark 4 : One might wonder, why should the consumer not exhibit fairness in the
second stage (when choosing own labour supply) as well as the ￿rst stage (when choosing
the tax rate)? However, it would make no di⁄erence. To see this, suppose that in the second
stage consumer j chooses lj so as to maximize
n P
i=1
!ijU (li;t;b;si) = !jjU (lj;t;b;sj) +
n P
i6=j
!ijU (li;t;b;si) given t;b;sj and given si, li for all i 6= j. Then, since in the Fehr-Schmidt
theory, U (li;t;b;si), i 6= j, enter additively, and !jj > 0, it follows that maximizing
n P
i=1
!ijU (li;t;b;si) is equivalent to maximizing U (lj;t;b;sj). One can also give general
arguments: 1. Bounded rationality: it is di¢ cult to calculate the e⁄ect of all of ones
consumption and labour supply decisions on the rest of society. But, come elections,
we are more inclined to think about these issues or seek advice. 2. Insigni￿cance of an
individual: by giving to charity I (say) su⁄er a large loss but make very little di⁄erence.
However, by voting for a redistributive tax, I force all others to make contributions, hence,
have a much greater e⁄ect.
123. Existence of a Condorcet winner
We now ask if a median voter equilibrium exists in a model with fair voters? As expected,
single peakedness of preferences turns out to be a very strong restriction. We instead use
the single crossing property of Gans and Smart (1996).
De￿nition 1 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) The ￿ single crossing￿property holds if for tax
rates t;T and voters j;J,
t < T, j < J, Wj (t;￿;￿;s) > Wj (T;￿;￿;s) ) WJ (t;￿;￿;s) > WJ (T;￿;￿;s).15





an increasing function of j.
Lemma 4 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) If the ￿ single crossing￿property holds, then the
median voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses the tax rate that is optimal for the
median voter.
The proofs of lemmas 3, 4 can be found in Gans and Smart (1996). The intuition
behind these lemmas is straighforward to illustrate in the following diagram in (b;t) space.
In Figure 3.1, the aggregate budget constraint of the economy, given in (2.5), is shown
by the straight upward sloping line, BB0, that has slope y. We show two indi⁄erence





@b be an increasing function of j i.e. IpIp is relatively ￿ atter (we show this in
section 3.1 below). The most preferred tax rate of the poor, tp, is greater than the most
preferred tax rate of the rich, tr. Hence, the preferred tax rates can be uniquely ordered
from the rich to the poor. This monotonicity property gives rise to the result in Lemma
4.
3.1. Main results















15Here we use ￿<￿to denote the usual ordering of real numbers. In the more general setting of Gans
and Smart (1996), ￿<￿is used to denote several (possibly di⁄erent) abstract orderings. In particular, a
literal translation of Gants and Smart (1996) would give: T < t, j < J, Wj (t;￿;￿;s) > Wj (T;￿;￿;s) )
WJ (t;￿;￿;s) > WJ (T;￿;￿;s), where ￿j < J ￿has the usual meaning ￿j is less than J ￿but ￿T < t ￿










Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Gans-Smart single crossing property.
Recall, from Lemma 2(a), that @v






￿ 0 as saying
that the marginal utility of an extra pound of bene￿t for a rich person is no more than
that for a poor person. Also recall, from Lemma 2(cii), that t 2 [0;1) ) @v







< 0 can be interpreted as saying that an extra 1% on the tax rate hurts a rich
person more than a poor person. Thus Assumption A1 roughly says that bene￿ts help the
poor more than the rich while taxes hurt the rich more than the poor. This is the basic




Recall, from Lemma 2(cii), that @v
@t < 0, for t < 1. Thus, an increase in tax (bene￿ts
remaining ￿xed), is undesirable for a sel￿sh-voter which is, of course, entirely reasonable.
Assumption A2 extends this to fair-voters as well. This puts an upper bound on envy.
Envy is not so great as to make a fair-voter like an increase in tax, even if it has no gain
for any one at all (in terms of an increase in bene￿t).16
Proposition 1 : Under assumptions A1 and A2 a majority prefers the tax rate that is
optimal for the median-voter.





























From Lemma 2, we know that
@v(t;b;s)
@t ￿ 0. The ￿rst two terms are, therefore, negative while the last
term (whose magnitude depends on the envy parameter, ￿) is positive. It is straightforward to show that
if ￿ is suitably bounded above, then assumption A2 holds.
14Corollary 1 : Under assumption A1, if utility is quasi-linear or if voters are sel￿sh (￿ =
￿ = 0), then a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter.
The result in Proposition 1 is potentially of fundamental importance for political econ-
omy. If one takes the view that issues of fairness and concern for others are important
human motivations that play a signi￿cant part in the actual design of redistributive tax
policies, then Proposition 1 provides conditions that allow one to model these concerns
within a direct democracy framework. Insofar as actual applications of a direct democ-
racy framework largely use quasi-linear preferences, Corollary 1 shows that fairly weak
conditions will allow the existence of a Condorcet winner.
4. Comparative static results
From now on, we concentrate on the quasi-linear case with constant elasticity of labour
supply i.e.






where ￿ is a constant satisfying
0 < ￿ ￿ 1. (4.2)
The case ￿ = 1 has special signi￿cance in the literature. In this case,





Meltzer and Richard (1981) use (4.3) to derive the celebrated result that the extent of
redistribution varies directly with the ratio of the mean to median income. Piketty (1995)
restricts preferences to the quasi-linear case with disutility of labour given by the quadratic
form, (4.3). Benabou and OK (2001) do not actually consider a production side and their
model has exogenously given endowments which evolve stochastically. Benabou (2000)
considers the additively separable case with log consumption and disutility of labor given
by the constant elasticity case, (4.1).
Lemma 5 : (a) Conditions (2.9) and (2.10) hold,
(b) labour supply of consumer j is l(t;b;sj) = (1 ￿ t)
￿ s￿
j and is independent of b,






(d) assumption A1 holds,






















































15From Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 (a) and (d) we get:
Corollary 2 : For the quasi-linear utility function (4.1), (4.2) with constant elasticity of
labour supply, ￿, a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median voter.
Proposition 2, below, gives the change in the tax rate chosen by the median voter, tm,
as various parameters in the model are changed.
Proposition 2 : (a) For fair voters, @tm
@￿ > 0, @tm
@￿ > 0.
(b) A fair median voter chooses a higher tax rate than a sel￿sh median voter.
(c) For sel￿sh and fair voters, j > m ) @tm
@sj > 0.
(d) For sel￿sh and fair voters, @tm
@sm < 0.
(e) For sel￿sh voters, j < m ) @tm
@sj > 0.
(f) For fair voters, for j < m,
@tm
@sj
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1+￿
m




















From part (a), the tax rate (equivalently, the ratio of social spending to GDP, see (2.6))
is increasing in ￿, ￿. The intuition is that an increase in ￿ increases disutility arising from
disadvantageous inequity. By increasing the redistributive tax rate, the median voter
reduces, relatively, the utility of anyone who is richer, hence, reducing disadvantageous
inequity. On the other hand, an increase in ￿ increases disutility arising from advantageous
inequity. An increase in the redistributive tax bene￿ts everyone poorer than the median
voter relatively more, reducing advantageous inequity.
Sel￿sh median voters would like to redistribute because they are poorer than the av-
erage voter. Part (b) follows by simply noting that fair median voters have an additional
tendency to redistribute on account of their fairness.
From Remark 1 and Proposition 2, sel￿sh and fair voters alike, respond to increased
a› uence of the very rich by redistributing more (part (c)) and so also raising the ratio of
social spending to GDP. Sel￿sh voters would like to redistribute more when the rich get
richer because average incomes increase and so the lumpsum available for redistribution is
higher. Fair voters have an additional motive to redistribute more, namely, that it reduces
disadvantageous inequity.
Parts (e)-(h) point out to an important di⁄erence in the predictions of the fair and
sel￿sh voter models. From part (e), for sel￿sh voters, an increase in poverty reduces the tax
16rate and the ratio of social spending to GDP. The intuition is that poverty reduces average
income available for redistribution, hence, reducing the marginal bene￿ts of increasing
the tax rate. For fair voters, however, the results can go either way; part (f) gives the
appropriate condition. The reason is that on the one hand, the fair voter is in￿ uenced by
very similar considerations as the sel￿sh voter (because the fair voter also cares about ￿ own￿
payo⁄). However, on the other hand, the empathy/concern for poorer voters, on account
of the disutility arising from advantageous inequity induces the fair voter in the opposite
direction i.e. greater redistribution. The interplay between these two opposing factors
determines if the fair voter will respond, unlike the sel￿sh voter, by redistributing more in
response to poverty. From parts (g), (h), for fair voters, if ￿ or ￿ is su¢ ciently high, then
empathy for the poorer voters (as well as envy of richer voters) becomes stronger, which
increases the tax rate and the ratio of social spending to GDP in response to increased
poverty.
4.1. Social spending in recessions
The sel￿sh and fair voter models alike, predict that a reduction in the skill of voters above
the median will reduce the ratio of social spending to GDP (Remark 1 and Proposition
2(c)). However, the two models di⁄er on what would happen to this ratio in response
to a decline in the skill of voters below the median (equivalently, an increase in poverty).
The sel￿sh voter model predicts that the ratio of social spending to GDP would decline
(Proposition 2(e)). On the other hand, the fair voter model predicts that this ratio will
increase, if ￿ and/or ￿ is su¢ ciently high (Proposition 2(g) and 2(h)). Recall that, in our
model, ￿ skill￿is just a measure of the ability of a voter to translate labour time into income.
We may, therefore, identify periods of high unemployment with episodes where the ￿ skills￿
of below median voters receive strong negative shocks. The sel￿sh voter model would then
predict a decline in the ratio of social spending to GDP, while the fair voter model would
predict an increase in this ratio. Thus, the sel￿sh voter model predicts procyclic movement
of the social spending to GDP ratio, while the fair voter model predicts a countercyclical
movement. For the US data, the prediction of the sel￿sh voter model is inconsistent with
the evidence, while the prediction of the fair voter model is consistent with the evidence;
see, for instance, Auerbach (2003).
4.2. Some illustrative calibration results
Consider a calibration exercise in a three voter model (m = 2, n = 3) with skill levels
s1 < s2 < s3. For simplicity of illustration, we take ￿ = 1. This accords with partitioning
society into three broad groups, namely, poor, middle class and rich. Proposition 2(f) can






as well as the
17horizontal plane passing through (0;0;0). In the plot we use ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ 2 [0:5;5] and
s2
3=s2
2 = 2:5 (hence, the income of the rich is 2.5 times the income of the middle income
voters, which is not unrealistic). Since,
@t2
@s1 is plotted along the vertical axis, the sel￿sh
voter model predicts that the graph will lie above the plane passing through (0;0;0), while
the fair voter model predicts that the graph will lie below the plane, especially when ￿;￿
are high. Keeping in mind that ￿ > ￿, the calibrations are consistent with the fair voter
model but not the sel￿sh voter model.17










Figure 4.1: Plot of @t￿
2= @s2
1.
4.3. Fairness and inequality
We plot in Figure 4.1 the redistributive tax chosen by a fair median voter, as given in
(4.4), when inequality and fairness vary simultaneously. We consider a three voter model
(m = 2, n = 3). The increase in inequality is caused by the rich getting richer (an increase
in s3), with s1 and s2 held ￿xed. This leads to the same comparative static e⁄ect in the
sel￿sh and the fair voter models i.e. an increase in redistributive tax (see Proposition
17The graph also plots the surface for ￿ < ￿ while the restriction in the FS model is that ￿ > ￿. This
rules out about half the area of the surface that we observe above the plane passing through (0;0;0).
Hence, the predictions of the sel￿sh voter model are even more at variance with the calibrations than is
suggested by a look at the plot.
182(c)). In Figure 4.1 we use the following simulations values, s1 = 1, s2 = 2:5 and s3, which
captures inequality, varies between 8 and 12. We ￿x ￿ = 0:5 and allow ￿, which captures
fairness to vary between 0:6 and 5.
5. Income distribution and the tax rate
In section 4 we have already seen the redistributive e⁄ect of changes in skill levels of voters
above and below the median voter. We are now interested in the redistributive outcome of
a change in the entire discrete distribution of skills (the analogue of second order stochastic
dominance when skills are continuous). There are a large number of measures of income
inequality. For discussions of these see, for example, Atkinson (1970), Marshall and Olkin
(1979), Preston (1990, 2006) and Zheng (2006). Here we shall consider two such measures.
De￿nition 2 : Consider the set of income vectors
I =
￿












i=1yi, j = 1;2; ::: ;n ￿ 1, we say that x Lorenz dominates y. If one of
these inequalities is strict, we say x strictly Lorenz dominates y. (Atkinson, 1970).
(b) If i < j ) xj ￿ xi ￿ yj ￿ yi, i;j = 1;2;:::;n, we say that x di⁄erence dominates y. If
one of these inequalities is strict, we say x strictly di⁄erence dominates y. (Marshall and
Olkin, 1979).
Remark 5 : It is easy to see that the condition of (b) is satis￿ed if, and only if, xi ￿yi is
non-increasing in i. Marshall and Olkin (1979) showed that di⁄erence dominance implies
Lorenz dominance, but not the reverse.
Remark 6 : Under (4.1), the pre-tax income of voter i is yi = sili = (1 ￿ t)
￿ s
1+￿
i , after tax
income is (1 ￿ t)yi+b and indirect utility is 1￿t
1+￿yi+b (from (2.3), (2.12), (4.1) and (10.24)).
Hence, for our model, the two inequality measures, di⁄erence dominance (Marshall and
Olkin, 1979) and utility gap dominance (Zheng, 2006), coincide.
Proposition 3 : For sel￿sh and fair voters, if the vector of incomes x 2 I (strictly)
di⁄erence dominates the vector of incomes y 2 I, then the tax rate associated with y is






















The relation between redistribution, fairness and inequality
For the sel￿sh and fair voter models alike, an increase in inequality, as measured by
an increase in (before-tax) income di⁄erences, will increase the tax rate (De￿nition 2,
Remark 5 and Proposition 3). For the fair voter model, there is another possible cause for
an increase in the tax rate, namely, an increase in ￿ fairness￿as measured by an increase in
￿ and/or ￿ (see Proposition 2(a), 2(g), 2(h)).
The existing literature ignores issues of fairness. In actual practice, empirical re-
searchers could be picking up any sequence of points along the surface in Figure 5. This
practice is likely to lead to mixed and possible contradictory results. As the ￿gure clari￿es,
low inequality-high fairness countries have the same redistribution as high inequality-low
fairness countries. However, controlling for fairness, a prediction of the model is that
one should have greater redistribution where inequality is higher18. To the best of our
knowledge this test has not been carried out. This issue, we believe, could have seriously
contaminated the existing literature￿ s attempt at ￿nding an empirical relation between
inequality and the extent of redistribution.
6. An economy with sel￿sh and fair voters
Experimental evidence indicates that there is a very large fraction (roughly 40-60 percent
depending on the experiment) of purely self-interested individuals. The behavior of these
individuals accords well with the predictions of the sel￿sh preferences model, even in
18Because the results are sensitive with respect to the de￿nition of inequality, we remind the reader
that in this exercise an increase in inequality arises from the rich getting richer which gives the same
comparative static results in the fair and the sel￿sh voter models.
20bilateral interactions. An important and interesting issue for theoretical and empirical
research is to examine the implications of heterogeneity of preferences in the population.
A range of theoretical and experimental work indicates that even a minority of individuals
with social preferences can signi￿cantly alter the standard predictions.
What is the predicted redistributive outcome when there are both sel￿sh and fair
voters? To keep the analysis simple, we concentrate on a 3 voter economy (m = 2, n = 3).
Here, there are 23 = 8 possible combinations of voters. Denoting by S and F respectively,
a sel￿sh and a fair voter, the 8 possible combinations of the voters (each combination
arranged in order of increasing skill level from left to right) are: SSS, FFF, SFF, SFS,
FSF, FFS, SSF, FSS.19 We have already looked at the ￿rst two cases, SSS and FFF,
of purely sel￿sh and purely fair voters above, hence, we concentrate below on the remaining
six cases that consider mixtures of the sel￿sh and the fair types.
If the jth voter, j = 1;2;3; is fair, then, his preferences and indirect utility are given
in (2.15), (2.16), (2.18) and (2.23). But if the jth voter, j = 1;2;3; is sel￿sh then his
preferences are given by the analogous expressions but with ￿ = ￿ = 0: Hence, there
is intra-group homogeneity of preferences within the groups of fair and sel￿sh voters but
inter-group heterogeneity across the two groups. A second source of heterogeneity across
all voters is the level of skill.
We consider the case ￿ = 1, (see (4.3) and the discussion following it). Denote by tk
j;
the most preferred tax rate of a voter with skill level sj, j = 1;2;3. The superscript
k = F;S denotes respectively a fair and a sel￿sh voter.
Proposition 4 : For the three voter model, the most preferred tax rates of a fair voter



















































































> 0, if ￿ >
2
3
. Otherwise, t3 = 0.
In any mixture of the two types of voters, the redistributive outcome is altered if and
only if, relative to the case of purely sel￿sh or purely fair voters, the identity of the median
voter alters. Proposition 5 checks the various cases.
19For instance, SFF denotes an economy in which the lowest skill voter is sel￿sh and the middle and
high skill voters are both fair.
21Proposition 5 : For the three voter model:
(a) When all voters are fair then tF
1 > tF
2 > tF






j j = 1;2;3.
(b) In cases FSF, FFS, SSF, FSS, the restriction ￿ < 1 ensures that the identity of the
median voter is the same as the median skill voter i.e. voter 2.
(c) In cases SFS and SFF, it is possible that the identity of the median voter and the











then the Condorcet winner is the lowest skill voter, voter 1. In the complementary case,
the Condorcet winner is the median skill voter, voter 2.
In cases FSF, FFS, SSF, FSS the median skill voter is decisive in the redistributive
tax choice and, hence, the redistributive outcome in the case of a mixture of voter types is
identical to an economy in which all voters are of the same type as the median skill voter.
In cases FSF, FFS two thirds of the voters are fair while a third are sel￿sh. However the
redistribute outcome in the former is controlled by a sel￿sh voter while in the latter it is
controlled by a fair voter. In cases SSF, FSS where a majority of the voters are sel￿sh,
the redistributive outcome is always controlled by a sel￿sh voter.
The interesting case arises when the inequality in (6.1) is satis￿ed. We illustrate the
implications for the case of a three voter SSF economy in (t;s) space in Figure 6.1 .
The poorest voter has sel￿sh preferences, but the middle class and the rich have fair
preferences. We depict two possible situations. The ￿rst is depicted by the (lighter) curve
labelled I. The height of each dot represents the most preferred tax rate of a voter with
the corresponding skill level. In this case, the median voter is the middle class voter who
is a Condorcet winner, condition (6.1) is not satis￿ed, and the tax rate t2 is implemented.
Now suppose that condition (6.1) is satis￿ed. Three factors are conducive to the
inequality in (6.1) being satis￿ed. First inequity aversion, as captured by the magnitudes
of ￿, ￿, should be high. Second, inequality at the upper end of the skill distribution, as
measured by the range, s3 ￿ s2, should be high. Third, inequality at the lower end of the
income distribution, as measured by the range, s2 ￿ s1, should be low. The new set of
most preferred tax rates are shown by graph II. The most preferred tax rate of the sel￿sh
voter is una⁄ected. However, now the rich-fair voter ￿nds the most preferred tax rate of
the poor-sel￿sh voter, t1, to be closer to her most preferred tax rate. A coalition of these
voters can now ensure that the Condorcet winner is t1.
Higher inequality at the upper end of the skill distribution, as measured by the range,
s3 ￿s2, ensures that the tax rates of the middle class-fair voter and the rich-fair voter are
















Figure 6.1: Big policy jumps when small changes take place.
Also note that in graph II, the poor-sel￿sh voter is more ￿ conservative￿than the middle
class-fair voter, in the sense that he/she prefers a relatively lower tax rate.
There are two interesting implications of Proposition 5(b):
1. In several cases, i.e., FSF, SSF, FSS the sel￿sh median skill voter is decisive . The
presence of fair voters does not alter the policy choice.
2. The introduction of low skill, sel￿sh voters can have large e⁄ects on policy when the
median voter is fair. This is most striking in the case SFF when condition (6.1) is
met. In this case, even when 2=3 of the voters are fair, redistribution is controlled
by a 1=3 of the poorest, but sel￿sh, voters. Thus, immigrants, insofar they are low
skilled can sometimes have large redistributive consequence. Over a longer horizon
this raises interesting issues of the dynamics of economic, cultural and social change.
7. An illustrative empirical exercise
In this section we test if redistribution is a⁄ected by (1) fairness, and (2) inequality.
While earlier empirical studies have also looked at the e⁄ect of income inequality on
redistribution, the novelty of our empirical exercise is twofold. First, we test for the e⁄ect
of fairness on redistribution. Second, we use factor incomes rather than disposable incomes
to generate the inequity measure.
23The empirical exercise is only of an illustrative nature because data on factor incomes,
which is crucial to testing the theory, is available only over a very short duration. This
prevents one from conducting a more satisfactory econometric exercise that would, for
instance, control extensively for country-speci￿c e⁄ects. Nevertheless, our results are in
line with other empirical results based on larger data sets and use disposable incomes
(rather than factor incomes) but ignore issues of fairness.
7.1. Description of the data
We use cross-country data for OECD economies for 200320. The list of variables and their
explanation is as follows.
Dependent Variables: The dependent variable, denoted by SS=GDP, is social spend-
ing as a percentage of GDP at current prices taken from Lindert (2003)21. We have also
tried as our dependent variable, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, TR=GDP.
Fairness Variables: We use three possible measures in this regard. The ￿rst, denoted
by ODA=GDP, is the ratio of ￿ O¢ cial development assistance￿to GDP for each country.
However, such assistance might also re￿ ect motives other than fairness such as ￿ strategic
giving￿ , motivated by political considerations. For that reason we use a second measure
of aid, namely, ￿ multilateral aid as a percentage of GDP; this is denoted by MA=GDP.
Data on these is available through OECD statistics22. Our third measure, denoted by
QAA=GDP is ￿ quality adjusted aid￿to GDP ratio drawn from an index compiled by
Roodman (2005).23
Inequality Variables: We have noted above the argument against using disposable
or post-tax incomes to construct inequality measures. However, factor income data is very
di¢ cult to obtain and till recently has been unavailable. Hence, most existing empirical
work has used data from disposable income to measure inequality. There have been two
main sources of data for measures of inequality, based on disposable income. The main
source is the ￿ Luxembourg Income Study￿(LIS), which collates micro-data from various
OECD countries based on survey information. The information is not contemporaneous.
So, for instance, while the data for the Scandinavian countries, United Kingdom and Italy
dates from 1995, that for Germany and France dates from 1994. See for instance, Figure
1 in Smeeding (2002). However, this is not a particularly serious problem because income
20The list of 20 countries that we use is as follows. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
21The underlying source is OECD, Social Expenditure Database 1980-1996.
22Our source is ￿ OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries￿ , 2004 edition.
23Aid is adjusted for quality in that it takes account, among other things, of (1) the recipients of aid
(relatively prosperous eastern European countries or abysmally poor sub-saharan African countries) (2)
tied versus untied aid (3) whether cancelled interest payments are counted as aid (4) quality of governance.
24inequality moves relatively slowly. The second main source of data is from the World Bank
(e.g. the 2005 World Development Indicators, Table 2.7). We indicate the Gini coe¢ cients
obtained from these two data sources, respectively, by Gini(LIS) and Gini(World Bank).
Disaggregated data is also available. LIS provides data on income by percentiles and the
World Bank breaks down the income distribution into 5 parts. Using each of these more
disaggregated data has its problems24.
Our point of departure from the existing literature in the use of inequality variables
is to rely instead on the newly created dataset on factor incomes that has been made
available in Milanovic (2000). Denote the Gini calculated on the basis of factor incomes
as Gini(Factor Income). We shall compare alternative regression speci￿cations based on
the various Gini coe¢ cients.
Control Variables: The ￿nal two variables are control variables that are not neces-
sarily related to inequality or to fairness. These are as follows. In line with several other
empirical studies, our ￿rst variable is the proportion of population aged 65 or over, de-
noted by Pop65. This takes account of transfers to the old. The second variable, denoted
by DUS, is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for United States and zero for all other
countries in the sample. The reasons for including a US dummy (relative to Europe) can
be found in several places in the literature and is referred to as ￿ American Exceptionalism￿ ;
for instance, Glaeser (2005).
7.2. Results
Tables I, II in Appendix 1 report the regression results. There are 20 observations and we
report the results of robust OLS estimation in Stata25. The Akaike information criteria,
AIC, and the Schwarz Bayesian information criteria, BIC, are used as speci￿cation tests
(lower values of these two indicators re￿ ect a better speci￿cation).
Table-I reports the relation between inequality and redistribution in the absence of
fairness concerns. The three columns for results in the table correspond respectively to
24LIS provides data on the ratio of 90th percentile to the median percentile and the 10th percentile
to the median percentile. However, each of these variables are highly correlated (the correlation is about
-0.85) hence they cannot be used simultaneously. The World Bank provides disaggregated information on
the bottom 10% , top 10%, bottom 20%, next 20% and so on. However, where does the median voter lie
among these? What would be an objective agglomeration of these ￿gures when one imagines society as
comprised of three broad groups: poor, middle class and rich? To us, the answer to these questions is not
clear. Hence, we focus only on the Gini coe¢ cients. This might not be a bad approximation because the
Gini is very highly correlated with the ratio of 90th percentile to the median percentile and with the 10th
percentile to the median percentile.
25The Stata regress command includes a robust option for estimating the standard errors using the
Huber-White sandwich estimators. This allows one to deal with problems about normality, heteroscedas-
ticity, or some observations that exhibit large residuals. With the robust option, the point estimates of
the coe¢ cients are exactly the same as in ordinary OLS, but the standard errors take into account the
issues mentioned above.
25the use of Gini (LIS), Gini (World Bank) and Gini (Factor income) as alternative
proxies for income inequality. It is clear that the AIC and the BIC unambiguously pick
the regression with Gini (Factor income) as the best speci￿ed. In this regression (the
last column), inequality has an insigni￿cant e⁄ect on redistribution, while both controls
are signi￿cant and have the correct signs.
Table-II uses the Gini (Factor income) as our inequality measure but introduces three
alternative notions of fairness, respectively, MA=GDP, ODA=GDP and QAA=GDP.
The regression corresponding to each is reported in columns 2, 3 and 4. The speci￿cation
tests unambiguously pick out the ￿rst regression, using MA=GDP, as the best speci￿ed.
Relative to Table-I, the AIC and BIC are substantially lower for all regressions in Table-II.
The fairness variables are all highly signi￿cant and have the correct signs. The intercept is
no longer signi￿cant and the two controls have the correct sign and are generally signi￿cant.
However, Pop65 is more signi￿cant across the regressions. The inequality variable is not
signi￿cant in any of these regressions26.
On the basis of the illustrative regression results we have three main conclusions. First,
inequality measured on the basis of factor incomes (rather than disposable incomes) leads
to a better speci￿cation. Second, the negative (and mostly signi￿cant) coe¢ cient on the
dummy variable for the US supports the idea of ￿ American Exceptionalism￿ . Third, the
fairness variable is a very important determinant of redistribution. Certainly, based on
the evidence, it is more important than the inequality variable, which the literature has
focussed on so far.
8. Conclusions
We replace the self interested voters in the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard (RRMR)
framework with voters who have a preference for fairness (as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999))
and ask the following questions. First, does a median voter equilibrium exist? Second, if
yes, then what are its properties? Third, what are the features of the equilibrium redis-
tributive policy when there is a mixture of fair and sel￿sh voters? Fourth, conditional on
data limitations, is fairness an important factor in determining redistribution?
Our ￿ndings are as follows. The single crossing property of Gans-Smart (1996) can be
used to demonstrate the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters are fair. Increased
fairness leads to a more redistributive outcome. Fair voters, if they are very fair, will
26This contrasts our results with Milanovic (2000) who ￿nds a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of factor
income inequality on redistribution to the poor. However the spirit of the theoretical predictions is that
everyone (rich, middle class and poor) receive a lumpsum transfer. For instance, expenditure on health
that everyone bene￿ts from but the poor possibly bene￿t more than the rich because they might not have
access to private medical care. Hence, the measure of redistribution often used in the empirical literature
i.e. social spending to GDP is the one we prefer to use.
26respond to poverty by redistributing more (and not less as the sel￿sh voter model predicts).
The ratio of social spending to GDP moves countercyclically in the fair voter model but
pro-cyclically in the sel￿sh voter model. The latter is not consistent with the evidence.
Introducing sel￿sh poor voters in an economy populated by fair voters can have large
e⁄ects on the redistributive equilibrium outcome. In particular, sel￿sh poor voters may be
more conservative than middle income fair voters, in the sense that the former may prefer
a lower tax rate than the latter. Thus, introducing sel￿sh poor voters in an economy
populated by fair voters can result in a reduction in redistribution. On the other hand,
introducing rich sel￿sh voters in an economy populated by fair voters will have no e⁄ect.
Our illustrative empirical exercise show that factor income inequality, which is the ap-
propriate variable suggested by theory, outperforms disposable income inequality, which is
largely used in existing empirical work. Fairness is a very signi￿cant variable in explaining
redistribution in OECD economies.
279. Appendix 1: Fairness, Inequality and Redistribution












Gini (World Bank) -
￿0:63￿
￿1:80 -

















R2 0:72 0:48 0:59
F 95:33 31:85 37:32
AIC 110:19 122:39 92:76
BIC 113:18 125:37 95:08
n 20 20 16
Note: t￿values in parentheses. Superscript ￿, ￿￿, ￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.
Table-II: Fairness, Inequality and Redistribution




































R2 0:80 0:72 0:71
F 92:41 65:20 0:55
AIC 85:20 88:93 89:10
BIC 89:06 92:01 92:19
n 16 16 16
Note: t￿values in parentheses. Superscript ￿, ￿￿, ￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.
2810. Appendix 2: Proofs
10.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Given t;b and si, U (li;t;b;si) is a continuous function of li on the non-empty compact set




= (1 ￿ t)siu1 ((1 ￿ t)sili + b;1 ￿ li) ￿ u2 ((1 ￿ t)sili + b;1 ￿ li), (10.1)
@2U
@b@li




= (1 ￿ t)
2 s
2
iu11 ￿ 2(1 ￿ t)siu12 + u22. (10.3)




and from (2.10a), (2.10b), (2.10c) and (10.3) we get





First, consider the case t = 1. From (2.11), U (li;1;b;si) = u(b;1 ￿ li). From (2.9b),
u(b;1 ￿ li) is a strictly decreasing function of li on (0;1]. By continuity, u(b;1 ￿ li) must
be a strictly decreasing function of li on [0;1]. Hence, the optimum must be
li = 0 at t = 1: (10.6)
Now suppose t 2 [0;1). From (2.1), (2.9a), (2.9c) and (10.1) we get:
@U
@li




(1;t;b;si) = (1 ￿ t)siu1 ((1 ￿ t)si + b;0)￿u2 ((1 ￿ t)si + b;0) < u1 (0;0)￿u2 (0;0) ￿ 0.
Hence, a maximum is an interior point, i.e.,
0 < li < 1. (10.7)
From (10.7) and (10.5) it follows that @2U
@l2




(li;t;b;si) = 0. (10.8)
29Since, from (2.9c), u2 (b;0) = 0, it follows, from (10.1) and (10.6), that (10.8) also holds
for t = 1. Hence, for any voter i, the labor supply,
li = l(t;b;si);t 2 [0;1], (10.9)
can be found by solving (10.8).
Since u is thrice continuously di⁄erentiable it follows, from (2.11) and (10.8) that
l(t;b;si) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable. If t = 1 then, from (10.6),
@li
@b = 0. Now
suppose t < 1. From (10.5), @2U
@l2
i < 0. Hence, from (10.4) and the implicit function















Let f (b) = 1
nt￿n
i=1sil(t;b;si). Since f (b) ￿ 0, f (b) is twice di⁄erentiable (hence
continuous) and f0 (b) ￿ 0 (from (10.10)), it follows that f (b) = b has a unique solution,
b(t;s) ￿ 0; and b(t;s) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable. ￿
10.2. Proof of Lemma 2



























= ￿[slu1 ((1 ￿ t)sl + b;1 ￿ l)]l=l(t;b;s) . (10.13)
Part (a) follows from (2.9a) and (10.11). Part (b) follows from (2.9a) and (10.12). Part
(c) follows from (2.9a), Lemma 1 (b) and (c), and (10.13). ￿






























































































































































is strictly increasing in j: (10.22)
From Lemma 4 and (10.22) we get that the median-voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses
the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. This establishes Proposition 1. ￿
10.4. Proof of Corollary 1
Note that if u is quasi-linear, then u(c;1￿l) = c￿f (l). Hence, U (l;t;b;s) = (1 ￿ t)sl +




@b = 1. From
this, and (10.16), we get that
@Vj























31where the inequality in (10.23) comes from (10.15). Hence, (10.22) again holds, but we
have not used Assumption A2.
If voters are sel￿sh, so that ￿ = ￿ = 0, then Assumption A2 reduces to @v
@t ￿ 0, which
we know holds from Lemma 2(c). This establishes Corollary 1. ￿
10.5. Proof of Lemma 5
Part (a) follows from (4.1) and (4.2) by straightforward calculation. For t 2 [0;1), part (b)
follows from (2.11), Lemma 1 (a), (d) and (4.1). From Lemma 1 (c), it follows that part
(b) also holds for t = 1. Thus ￿ is elasticity of labour supply with respect to disposable
income. From (2.13) and part (b), we get yi = (1 ￿ t)
￿ s
1+￿
i and hence, from (2.4), we get
part (c). Using (2.11), (2.12), (4.1), (4.2) and part (b), we can verify that part (d) holds.
We now turn to part (e). From (2.1), (2.3), (2.5), (2.11), (2.12), (2.14), (2.16), (2.17),




















































i , for t < 1, (10.27)
@wm (t;s)
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, for t < 1, (10.30)
@2wj (t;s)




























i , for t < 1,
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i , for t < 1,
32@2wm (t;s)






















































> 0, for k > m, for t < 1, (10.35)


































































































































< 0, for t < 1.
Set
@Wm(t;￿;￿;s)























































0 < tm < 1. (10.40)
In the light of (10.38), Wm (t;￿;￿;s) attains a unique global maximum on (0;1) at t = tm.









































33Hence, t = tm is the unique global maximum of Wm (t;￿;￿;s) on [0;1). Next, from (10.36),
we get
Wm (1;￿;￿;s) = 0, (10.42)
























































































From (10.42) and (10.43), we see that t = tm is the unique global maximumof Wm (t;￿;￿;s)
on [0;1]. ￿



















































i > 0. (10.45)
It follows that an increase in x will increase tm. In particular, an increase in ￿ or an
increase in ￿ (or both) will increase tm. This establishes part (a). It also follows that a
fair median voter (￿ > 0;￿ > 0) will vote for a higher tax rate than a sel￿sh median voter
(￿ = ￿ = 0). This establishes part (b).



















































Hence, an increase in the skill of voter-workers above the median will increase the tax rate,



































































34Hence, for sel￿sh and fair voters alike, a reduction of the skill of the median voter with
increase the tax rate. Conversely, an increase in the skill of the median voter will reduce
the tax rate. This establishes part (d).































































Part (f) follows from (90) since the coe¢ cients of ￿ and ￿ in the numerator are positive.
Set ￿ = ￿ = 0 in (10.48) to get, for a sel￿sh median voter,















￿2 > 0, (10.49)
Thus, a sel￿sh median voter responds to a reduction in the skill of consumers below the
median by reducing the tax rate. This establishes part (e). Recall, from Remark 1, that
the tax rate in our model equals the ratio of social spending to aggregate income. Hence, to
the extent that low skill workers are more adversely a⁄ected in a recession, the sel￿sh voter
model predicts pro-cyclic movement of the ratio of social spending to aggregate income.
Also, from (10.48), it follows that
for j < m,
@tm
@tj
< 0, if ￿ or ￿ is su¢ ciently large. (10.50)
By contrast, a fair median voter responds to a reduction in the skill of consumers
below the median by increasing the tax rate, provided that voter cares su¢ ciently about
inequality. Hence, to the extent that low skill workers are more adversely a⁄ected in
a recession, the fair voter model predicts counter cyclic movement of the ratio of social
spending to aggregate income, in agreement with the evidence.












> 0 it follows, from (10.48), that






























































35Hence, if the median voter su¢ ciently dislikes disparity with higher skill consumers, then
he/she will vote for a higher tax rate in response to a reduction in the skill of low skill
workers. This establishes part (g).









> 0 we get, form (10.48),


































































































































Hence, provided the median voter cares su¢ ciently about consumers with lower skill,
he/she will vote for a higher tax rate in response to a reduction in the skill of low skill
workers. However, we need to check that the lower bound on ￿ in (10.55) is feasible, i.e.,
is consistent with ￿ < 1. That this is the case, is established by (10.56), below, using (2.1)












1 + 2(m ￿ 1)
< 1 (10.56)
This completes the proof of part (h). ￿
10.7. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Let tm and Tm be the tax rates corresponding to x 2 I and y 2 I, respectively.













































































































If x di⁄erence dominates y (De￿nition 2), then 0 < x ￿ y. Hence, tm ￿ Tm. If x strictly
di⁄erence dominates y, then 0 < x < y. Hence, tm < Tm. ￿
10.8. Proof of Proposition 4






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From (10.66), (10.67) and (10.68), W1 attains a unique interior maximum, t1, which
is found by solving
@W1(t)
@t = 0. Similarly, from (10.70), (10.71) and (10.72), W2 attains a
unique interior maximum, t2, which is found by solving
@W2(t)
@t = 0. If ￿ > 2
3 then, from
(10.76), it can be checked that
@2W3(t)
@t2 < 0. It then follows from (10.74) and (10.75) that
W3 attains a unique interior maximum, t￿
3, which is found by solving
@W3(t)
@t = 0. Suppose






t=0 ￿ 0. If
@2W3(t)
@t2 < 0, then t3 = 0 is the unique
optimum. If
@2W3(t)
@t2 ￿ 0 then, from (10.74), t3 = 0 is, again, the unique optimum. ￿
10.9. Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof of part (a) simply follows from the general case of n voters considered earlier
(see Proposition 1) and Proposition 2(b). To prove (b) we now consider the various cases
below.
1. In the case FSF, tF
2 > tS




which case the median voter and median skill individuals coincide. From Proposition
384, ￿3 ￿ 2
3 is su¢ cient for this case. (2) tF
1 > tF
3 > tS
2. in which case, voter 3 becomes
the median voter. However, when ￿3 > 2














The LHS of (10.77) is greater than 1: The RHS is monotonically increasing in ￿.
Since 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; the RHS is bounded within [0;1). Thus we get a contradiction
and the inequality in (10.77) cannot hold. So we cannot have tF
3 > tS
2. This rules
out the second case. If the ￿rst case holds then the median voter and median skill
individuals coincide.
2. In the case FFS; since tF
3 > tS




3. Hence, voter 2 is also
the median voter.
3. In the case SSF we know that tS
1 > tS
2 so the only two outcomes that will alter
the identity of the median voter are as follows (1) tS
1 > tF
3 > tS
2 in which case the
fair-rich voter wins. (2) tF
3 > tS
1 > tS
2 in which case the sel￿sh-poor voter wins. We
can simply rule out both cases because the inequality in (10.77) does not hold when
0 ￿ ￿ < 1.





the median voter and the median skill individual coincide.
To prove (c) we need to consider the following two cases:
1. SFF: From (a) we know that tF
1 > tF
2 > tF
3 ; so if tS
1 > tF
2 > tF
3 we are done and the
median voter coincides with the median skill voter. However, if tS
1 < tF
2 then have a













If (10.78) holds then we get that tS
1 < tF
2 > tF
3 , so we need to compare tS
1;tF
3 to
























2 which contradicts the supposed
inequality in (10.79), hence, tS
1 ￿ tF
3 . Hence, if (10.78) holds then the only possible
case is that tF
3 < tS
1 < tF
2 and so the poorest skill voter becomes the decisive median
voter.
392. SFS : From (a) we know that tS
1 > tS
3. From the previous case we know that if
inequality (10.78) holds, then tS
1 < tF
2 . In which case, we get tS
3 < tS
1 < tF
2 and so the
poorest skill voter becomes the decisive median voter in choosing the redistributive
tax rate. ￿
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